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Christian Jochim Naturalistic ethics in a Chinese context: Chang 
Tsai's Contribution 
Aiming to breathe new life into naturalistic ethics, this essay considers what is, 
for the West, a new way of grasping the moral significance of "following 
nature." In doing so, it explores certain unique features in the development of 
Chinese naturalistic ethics and avoids interpreting this as corresponding to an 
early stage in the evolution of Western philosophy. The two most important 
features of Chinese naturalistic ethics that it explores are: (1) the idea that the 
naturalness of some form of human behavior is a valid criterion of its moral 
goodness, and (2) the view that harmony with the natural order is charac- 
teristic of a high degree of moral cultivation. Each of these corresponds to a 
trend in Chinese thought lasting from its "formative period" (circa 500-200 
B.C.E.) up to Sung times (960-1279 C.E.). Their synthesis in the thought of 
Sung philosopher Chang Tsaia (1020-1077) is below shown to mark a 
watershed in the course of Chinese moral philosophy. 
The article is divided into three sections: the first deals with general 
problems in the area of comparative East-West studies; the second treats the 
two previously mentioned trends which emerged during the formative period 
of Chinese philosophy; and the third deals, specifically, with Chang Tsai. 
ON THE PRIMITIVITY OF NATURALISTIC ETHICS 
One form of reductionism that can plague comparative studies occurs when 
some foreign way of thinking is taken to correspond to an early stage in the 
development of one's own intellectual tradition. A case of this is evident in 
Donald Munro's otherwise excellent work The Concept of Man in Early 
China.' Commenting on the "natural basis of the social" in the thought of late 
Chou Confucians, he makes the remark: "When philosophical thought is just 
about to emerge in a society there is a tendency to read the human social order 
into the structure of the universe."2 In the West, Munro indicates, this 
occurred when the pre-Socratics assigned each of their four basic elements 
(earth, air, fire, and water) a sphere of natural influence analogous to one of 
the inviolate social divisions specified by Greek tribal customs.3 The Chinese, 
he argues, had an even stronger penchant for reading human social and moral 
values into nature. Not only was the social idea of proper spheres of influence 
read into the universe (also as part of a theory of the elements), but so were 
such important moral concepts as sincerity (ch'engb), humanity (jenc), and 
propriety (lid). In essence, the idea of cosmic order was itself abstracted from 
human social experience.4 
Munro's assessment of the role given nature in the socioethical views of late 
Chou philosophers has been challenged, but not due to any heightened 
sensitivity toward the idea that moral knowledge can be derived from, not 
Christian Jochim is an Interim Instructor and Ph.D. candidate in the School of Religion at the 
University of Southern California, Los Angeles. 
Philosophy East and West 31, no. 2 (April, 1981). © by the University Press of Hawaii. All rights reverved. 
166 Jochim 
read into, the natural world. It has been criticized, for example, by Henry 
Rosemont for emphasizing passages that suggest a natural basis for ethics in 
the otherwise thoroughly rational and humanistic writings of the early 
Confucians.5 The revealing thing is Rosemont's feeling that the issue is not of 
any philosophical significance, "except that it attributes a fairly naive monism 
to the Confucians."6 Perhaps he feels this way because, like Munro, he takes 
for granted that there must be something primitive about any ethics which 
looks to nature for principles to guide human behavior. However, an ethics of 
this type is only primitive from a particularly modern point of view which 
assumes a priori that nature is devoid of ethical qualities. The sources of this 
perspective must be examined before one can render any judgments concern- 
ing naturalistic ethics in a Chinese context. 
Increased urbanization, greater control over the natural world, the emer- 
gence of the Darwinian model of nature, and related developments within 
philosophy and theology have contributed to the view that the natural realm is 
an amoral one. Characteristic of these developments, and a locus classicus on 
the subject of nature's irrelevance for the moral life, is John Stuart Mill's essay 
on "Nature." The following quote is from the conclusion to that essay. 
The scheme of nature regarded in its whole extent, cannot have had, for its 
sole or even principal object, the good of human or other sentient beings. 
What good it brings to them, is mostly the result of their own exertions. 
Whatsoever, in nature, gives indication of beneficent design, proves this 
beneficence to be armed with only limited power; and the duty of man is to 
cooperate with the beneficent powers, not by imitating but by perpetually 
striving to amend the course of nature-bringing that part of it over which we 
can exert control more nearly into conformity with a high standard of justice 
and goodness.7 
Within this type of perspective, as Mill argues, the only positive value the term 
"natural" can denote is the absence of affectation.8 It is foolish from this point 
of view to consider what is natural to be a criterion for what is moral. 
Another perhaps even more significant trend that underlies the West's drift 
away from naturalistic ethics was initiated early in the twentieth century by 
G. E. Moore, himself a critic of John Stuart Mill. In his Principia Ethica,9 
Moore drew attention to an error in logic that he felt was inherent in any 
attempt to derive an ethical norm (an "ought" statement) from a belief about 
the nature of things (an "is" statement). The peculiar designation that he used 
for this error, the "naturalistic fallacy," has become standard in recent moral 
discourse; and its avoidance has become a commandment of contemporary 
ethics. "Naturalistic fallacy" is a peculiar term, in the first place, because it can 
be applied to an ethics in which nature is denied any substantive role, such as 
that of Mill, who was criticized by Moore for reducing a value term 
("goodness") to an empirically determinable property ("desirability").'° It is 
peculiar, second, because it has led to the perhaps false yet widely held 
167 
assumption that its discovery was the death knell of ethical naturalism, and 
also ethical supernaturalism, in any form."1 
However, not all recent Western moral philosophers have shared this 
assumption. The American pragmatist John Dewey, for example, was a 
proponent of ethical naturalism who gained a large following in the West and 
(interesting to note in this regard) in China. In Human Nature and Conduct, he 
sought to bridge the gap between the natural and the moral by giving a role 
within ethics to "natural impulses" and the empirical observation of human 
behavior. Indicative of this aspect of his approach in that work is the 
statement: "Morality is an endeavor to find for the manifestation of impulse in 
specific situations an office of refreshment and renewal." 12 Yet, on the whole, 
his approach was too qualified to be called an ethics of "following nature." 
A position that is more appealing for present purposes, a variation upon 
what has been called "ethical supernaturalism," is outlined in a recent article 
by John Crossley.'3 Following Richard Brandt, he takes "ethical supernatural- 
ism" to mean a particular way of justifying ethical statements in which they 
are derived from theological premises in a fashion that appears to commit the 
naturalistic fallacy. He gives the example14: 
Premise: God is the Creator and loving Father of all men. 
Conclusion: You should love Him and all men. 
Due to an implied second premise ("Anyone whom God has created should 
love Him and His creation"), Crossley points out, the syllogism is formally 
correct. When we realize that the second premise is an ethical as well as a 
theological one, we see that the real problem lies beyond any formal distinc- 
tion between a theological (descriptive) statement and an ethical (normative) 
one. As Crossley puts it: "There is no logical fallacy in the justifying 
procedure; the 'problem' lies rather in how one knows in the first place that 
either of the premises is true." '5 
When Crossley addresses this problem, the results are noteworthy for any 
effort to relate the moral to the ontological (whether one's metaphysics is 
naturalistic or supernaturalistic). He considers the experience of a "claim" on 
oneself the starting point for both theology and ethics, explaining his view as 
follows: 
The religious experience of gratitude and the moral experience of obligation have the same root, viz., the experience of being claimed. The experience of God is already partially a moral experience, and the experience of obligation is 
already. partially a religious experience. This "double" yet finally single 
starting point for both theology and ethics overcomes, on the one hand, the 
problem of deriving an ought from an is, and on the other hand, the problem 
of theological ethics remaining aloof from ordinary moral experience.16 
While not immediately relevant, one may wonder whether this theological 
language has any bearing upon an investigation into the viability of Chinese 
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naturalistic ethics. Following Crossley a little further, it seems that there is 
indeed a connection. His final appeal is to process theology, "because such 
theology tends by its nature to stick close to human experience in its 
development." 17 This connection is worth mentioning here not only because 
process thought itself drives theology away from supernaturalism, but also 
because it has affinities with the Chinese views to be discussed later. This will 
become clear even as the first part of this essay is concluded, but it will 
especially strike us when we later see how Chang Tsai's thought itself is dually 
grounded in the moral and the ontological. 
The preceding examples reveal, in different ways, the verdict of modern 
Western ethics on the subject of the moral viability of the imperative "follow 
nature"; and, in so doing, they raise further questions. Against what did 
modern thinkers such as Mill, Dewey, and others react? What was meant by 
"following nature" in the premodern philosophies against which they reacted? 
The answer to such questions lies largely in considering two essential elements 
of the moral understanding of nature in the premodern West: providence and 
natural law (each of which takes for granted the idea of supernatural influence 
upon nature). 
Both Mill and Dewey oppose any demand to follow nature when defined as 
a demand to act in compliance with purposes or laws of divine origin,'8 and 
Crossley leans away from traditional supernaturalism toward process theo- 
logy. It is far from self-evident that this kind of opposition is directly 
applicable to Chinese usages of nature as an ethical category. Consider, in 
relation to this, the implications of a statement made by Joseph Needham in 
concluding his well-known essay "Human Law and the Laws of Nature in 
China and the West." In contradistinction to the Western view of nature, 
dependent upon the idea of an external lawgiver, Needham explains: 
The Chinese world-view depended on a totally different line of thought. The 
harmonious cooperation of all beings arose, not from the orders of a superior 
authority external to themselves, but from the fact that they were all parts in 
a hierarchy of wholes forming a cosmic pattern, and what they obeyed were 
the internal dictates of their own natures.19 
In conclusion, the reasons for the rejection, by most contemporary ethicists, 
of the command to follow nature may not be at all relevant to Chinese ethics 
with its processual underpinnings. It is careless to assume, without considering 
these reasons, that naturalistic ethics in any form belongs among the errors of 
our bygone past. Below, certain Chinese efforts to employ nature as an ethical 
category will be treated with the aim in mind of rendering a fresh judgment 
upon their viability. 
NATURALISTIC ETHICS IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 
Discussion focuses here on just two ways in which early Chinese thinkers used 
the "natural" as a moral category, without insisting that these were the only 
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important ones ever to emerge in China. The first concerns the idea that the 
naturalness of some form of human behavior is a valid criterion of its moral 
goodness; and the second concerns the view that harmony with the natural 
order is characteristic of a high degree of moral cultivation. 
Each of the suggested uses of the concept "natural" conveys a different 
shade of meaning. The idea of the naturalness of a certain form of behavior 
refers specifically to what is "natural" for a human being, that is, to innate 
human tendencies. The idea of the moral worth of harmony with nature is 
more closely connected with the "natural" as it pertains to the course of things 
apart from humanity. Two important schools of early Chinese thought each 
respectively emphasized one of these two senses of "natural." The Confucians 
were interested in what kind of behavior was natural for the human. The 
Taoists paid attention to what was natural apart from homo sapiens, not 
praising this species for any unique qualities. 
Within early Confucianism, Mencius provides the classical interpretation of 
morality as being distinctively human but, at the same time, naturally 
grounded. Interestingly, the most famous passage expressing this interpre- 
tation begins with a story that demonstrates the naturalness of human 
response in the face of a moral "claim." Mencius therein states: 
My reason for saying that no man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the suffering 
of others is this. Suppose a man were, all of a sudden, to see a young child on 
the verge of falling into a well. He would certainly be moved to compassion, 
not because he wanted to get in the good graces of the parents, nor because he 
wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or friends, nor yet because he 
disliked the cry of the child. From this it can be seen that whoever is devoid of 
the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of shame 
is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not 
human, and whoever is devoid of the heart of right and wrong is not human. 
The heart of compassion is the germ of benevolence; the heart of shame, of 
dutifulness; the heart of courtesy and modesty, of observance of the rites; the 
heart of right and wrong, of wisdom. Man has these four germs just as he has 
four limbs (2A: 6).20 
Three things of significance mark this passage: (1) Mencius argues for the 
original goodness of human nature, (2) he does so by reference to an experience 
of moral obligation, and (3) he presents this experience as a natural basis for 
morality. All three observations make sense in light of the idea of the 
naturalness of an act as a criterion of its goodness. D. C. Lau, translator of the 
preceding passage, has stressed how Mencius specifically intended to convey 
his hypothetical man's altruistic disinterestedness ("not because he wanted to 
get in the good graces of the parents," and so on) and, also, the spontaneous- 
ness of the man's experience of his heart of compassion.2' Similarly, Mencius 
insists that each of the four germs, or four beginnings,22 is the natural and 
experiential root of one of the four Confucian cardinal virtues: benevolence 
(jen), dutifulness (ie), observance of the rites (li), and wisdom (chihf). 
Donald Munro develops this further by pointing out two criteria used by 
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early Confucians to recognize what was natural for humans, and therefore 
good: (1) the ease or joy with which it occurs in practice and (2) its automatic 
appeal to the babelike mind or heart (ch'ih-tzu-chih-hsing).23 In addition to the 
passage already quoted, these are suggested elsewhere in Mencius: 
Mencius said "... reason and rightness (i) please my mind in the same way as 
meat pleases my palate" (6A:7). And, "A great man is one who retains the 
heart of a new-born babe" (4B: 12).24 
Munro and other scholars have even found hints in Mencius of a fundamental, 
perhaps "religious," experience with both moral and ontological dimensions. 
The key reference in Mencius (2A:2) describes a relationship between i 
(dutifulness or rightness) and a certain floodlike ch'ih (ether or matter-energy). 
This relationship is such that cultivation of i is closely tied to one's ontological 
grounding in the universe. This is, in particular, the interpretation of Cheng 
Chung-ying in his article "On yi as a universal principle of specific 
Application in Confucian morality." 25 
Looking at another side of the issue, Mencius considered some tendencies of 
humans utterly devoid of moral significance. The mouth's taste for meat may 
be analogous to the mind's inclination toward reason and rightness, but 
Mencius considered the latter absolutely different from the former (7B:24). 
Just how this view could be reconciled with that of the goodness of human 
nature remained problematic up to Chang Tsai's time (see following). 
In contrast to Mencius' qualified use of naturalness as a moral criterion, the 
author of the Tao-te-chingi set forth a concept of the natural, uncolored by 
any bias toward the particular qualities or needs of the human species. The 
resulting view of behavior might, from a thoroughly homocentric point of 
view, be branded "amoral." Interpreted differently, however, this text may be 
said to advocate the complete merging of the natural and moral spheres. When 
refusing to distinguish between good and evil, the Tao-te-ching intends only 
to reject that kind of moral consciousness which thinks solely in terms of what 
is good or bad for humanity.26 It likewise aims to shun all homocentric values 
with its assertion: "Heaven and Earth are not humane (jen). They regard all 
things as straw dogs."27 But it does so only in order to set up an alternative 
set of moral values, exhibited by nature for human emulation. These include 
simplicity, spontaneity, tolerance, adaptability, impartiality, and the talent of 
yielding in appropriate circumstances. 
There is difficulty in interpreting Lao-tzu this way not only because of this 
earlier mentioned rejection of conventional morality, but also because his 
work lacks the "prescriptive" tone of normative ethics. Evidence of this lies in 
the use of simple declarative English, for most passages, by translators of the 
Tao-te-ching (who intentionally choose this over imperative usages, there being 
no distinction apart from context in classical Chinese between the two forms 
of usage). Yet some of these same translators insist upon viewing Lao-tzu as a 
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moral, political philosopher.28 In light of his professed antimoralistic stance 
and his apparently nonnormative style, how can he be so viewed? 
Anyone seriously interested in answering this question should consult Sung- 
peng Hsu's insightful article "Lao Tzu's Conception of Evil," which helps us 
to see that Lao-tzu's implicit morality has both a consistent unifying theme 
and a definite content.29 The theme is that of condemning the assertive use of 
the will as the cause of all unnecessary suffering in the world. The content 
consists, first, in avoiding such products of "willful action" (weij) as war, 
competition, exploitation of the common people, and alteration of the natural 
world, and, second, in cultivating such values that coincide with the ability "to 
act with no willful actions" (wei wu-weik) as the aforementioned values of 
simplicity, spontaneity, and so on. This is not especially new to students of the 
Tao-te-ching, but Hsu's effort to treat this work as a moral treatise, making 
specific reference to the descriptive/normative problem, is both new and 
extremely pertinent to the concerns of this article. 
Hsu refers to the products of the assertive use of the will as "causal evils" 
and distinguishes these from "consequential evils," which are the unnecessary 
sufferings which result secondarily from "causal evils."30 Strictly speaking, 
then, only the first are a proper target for moral condemnation, while the 
second simply give us a reason to have compassion for the suffering of others. 
At this point, a problem arises: among the condemnable products of the 
assertive use of the will, Lao-tzu identifies prescriptive morality itself. 
However, the problem is not that Lao-tzu objects to the moral life as such; he 
condemns only its degeneration into a form characterized by willfulness and 
affectation. Therefore, Lao-tzu's idea of the decline of Tao may afford a 
solution to this apparent problem, and to the related problem of the existence 
of evil in a world spontaneously produced from Tao. The relevant passages 
from the Tao-te-ching are cited by Hsu, as follows31: 
Therefore, when Tao is lost, there arises te.' 
When te is lost, jen appears. When jen is lost, there comes i. 
When i is lost, there appears li. What then is li? 
It is the weakness of loyalty and trust. 
It is the beginning of chaos in the world (ch. 38). 
When the great Tao declines, there appear jen and i (ch. 18). Abandon jen and discard i. 
Then the people will return to filial piety and compassion (ch. 19). 
Thus, mainstays of Confucian morality like jen, i, and li are naught but 
symptoms of the Tao's decline. We must give up our reliance upon them if we 
are ever to manifest our true and natural moral qualities (for example, filial 
piety and compassion). Otherwise, we will manage only to make matters 
worse; for the operations of Tao can never be disturbed with impunity. 
But how can one speak of interfering with its operations at all? Hsu gives us 
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two reasons to believe that Lao-tzu can sensibly do so: (1) the human will is 
put in a position of potential interference by Tao's decline, and (2) the will is, 
in principle, free to interfere at all times. More striking is Hsu's view that the 
idea of free will, far from being out of place in Lao-tzu's world-view, makes 
more sense there than it does in the Western context in which a more explicit 
free will theodicy was produced. He states: 
It is important to note that Lao Tzu has no doubt that the will is free to 
interfere with Tao. He is afraid that the use of the will, however, will cause 
sufferings in the world and turn the spontaneous universe into a mechanistic 
one bound by laws and virtues. How different is it from the dominant Western 
philosophy, which tries to find in the supposedly mechanistic universe a room 
for the freedom of the will so that it can build an ideal human society apart 
from nature.32 
Whether cultivating a moral lifestyle thoroughly in harmony with nonhuman 
nature, such as Lao-tzu advocated, would be any more feasible than construct- 
ing an ideal human society apart from nature is hard to say. But one thing is 
clear: his view of moral cultivation refused to tread just where the early 
Confucians found their starting point-in the realm of values that are 
uniquely human. Yet it was this antithetical difference which made the two 
views susceptible to synthesis. Even before the close of the so-called formative 
period of Chinese philosophy, the work of synthesis had begun in both the 
Confucian and Taoists camps. Two brief examples must here suffice. 
In the Confucian text Chung-yungm (The Mean in Action), the concept 
ch'eng (sincerity), normally denoting the virtue of being completely true of 
one's innately good human nature, was given an expanded cosmological 
significance in at least one passage. It there states: "Sincerity is not only the 
completion of one's own self, it is that by which all things are completed" 
(ch. 25).33 As will become clear in looking at Chang Tsai's case, this was of no 
small significance. 
On the Taoist's side, such texts as the Chuang-tzun and the Huai-nan-tzu0 
led toward synthesis by unfolding the idea, hinted at in the Tao-te-ching, that 
the Tao particularizes itself in each individual thing. Chuang-tzu especially 
thrived on this notion. For him, understanding nature meant grasping the 
unique function and idiosyncratic worth of each part. Expressing the heart of 
his perspective, he queried: 
[Heaven] Blowing on the ten thousand things in a different way, so that each 
can be itself-all take what they want for themselves, but who does the sound- 
ing? (ch. 2).34 
This is precisely the perspective which led Joseph Needham to his previously 
quoted conclusion, and also to his use of the designation "philosophy of 
organism" to describe the traditional Chinese organismic thinking for the 
particular view of human nature that the early Confucians had devised.35 
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CHANG TSAI'S ETHICS 
The synthetic nature of Chang Tsai's work is expressed through his ability to 
see all values as being represented on two levels: the cosmological level of the 
physical universe and the ethical level of human existence. This is evidenced in 
the amalgam of "Taoistic" universal harmony and Confucian filial piety found 
in the opeing lines of his famous Hsi-mingP (Western Inscription): 
Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature 
as I find an intimate place in their midst. 
Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that which 
directs the universe I consider as my nature. 
All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions.36 
Furthermore, this describes an experience, which was for Chang a deeply 
religious one, that provided a double (moral and ontological) ground for all of 
his other endeavors, For Chang, the difference between the two dimensions 
was at most one of degree, which accounts for his facility in moving from one 
to the other. There are no distinctions in Chang's universe that are not 
distinctions merely of degree; the universe is composed entirely of ch'i (matter- 
energy) in its alternating aspects of dispersion and condensation. 
According to Chang, the source of all things and of all goodness in the 
universe is ch'i in its purest aspect-as the 'Great Vacuity' (t'ai-hsiiu). Nothing 
in the universe is without some element of goodness, although the potential for 
evil increases where ch'i is condensed and turbid. Consider the view expressed 
in the following passage. 
Master Heng-ch'ii [Chang Tsai] said: As the Great Vacuity, material force 
(ch'i) is extensive and vague. Yet it ascends and descends in all ways without 
ever ceasing. Here lies the subtle, incipient activation of reality and unreality, 
of motion and rest, and the beginning of yin and yang, as well as the elements 
of strength and weakness.... Whether it be the countless variety of things in 
their changing configurations or the mountains and rivers in their fixed forms, 
the dregs of wine or the ashes of fire, there is nothing from which something 
cannot be learned.37 
As in the Taoist views that had earlier suggested a philosophy of organism, all 
parts of nature have their unique worth. However, for Chang, this same 
principle is also expressed on a specifically human level. He states: "Heaven 
forms the substance of all things and nothing can be without it. It is like 
humanity (jen), which forms the substance of all human affairs and is present 
everywhere." 38 
Looking at the other side of the omnipresence of ch'i, the potential for evil 
which arises wherever it is heavily condensed, we also find important ethical 
implications. Just as ch 'i in its fully dispersed aspect as the great vacuity (and 
interchangeably "heaven" and "tao") corresponds to goodness in humanity, 
so also does ch'i in its condensed aspect as concrete things correspond to the 
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human's evil-tending "physical nature." In the following passage from his 
Cheng-mengr (Correction of Youthful Folly), Chang speaks of this latter aspect 
of ch'i as its "aspect of desire." 
Tranquility and oneness characterize the Ether (ch'i) in its original aspect; 
aggressiveness and acquisitiveness characterize it in its aspect of desire. The 
concentration of the mouth and the belly upon drinking and eating, and of 
those of the nose and tongue upon smelling and tasting: such is the aggressive 
and acquisitive kind of nature. He who understands virtue allows (his body) to 
have a sufficiency of these and no more. He neither enchains his mind with 
sensual desire, injures the ereat with what is small, nor destroys the root with 
what is peripheral (ch. 6).3 
One may note the similarity between this and Mencius' view concerning 
sense inclinations as they exist within the individual along with the innately 
good human nature. Chang, however, goes beyond Mencius in offering a 
justification for viewing human behavior in this light. Doing so with his so- 
called doctrine of the physical nature, Chang gained the praise of later Sung 
philosophers, especially Chu Hsis.40 
Referring to the activity of ch'i, Chang at once solved the problem of 
making a distinction between the two natures and also that of defining their 
relation to one another. The originally good human nature, akin to Heaven, 
was tied to ch'i as the Great Vacuity; the physical nature was, on the other 
hand, connected with ch'i in its condensed aspect. The difference between the 
two was ultimately one only of degree, so Chang could therefore speak of their 
relationship in terms of the transformation of the physical nature, as in his 
statement: "The great benefit of learning is to enable one to transform the 
physical nature himself."41 
With the idea of the transformation of the physical nature, we arrive at the 
true merit of Chang's moral philosophy. This transformation may be affected 
through learning, but not of the ordinary sense-oriented kind. It is best 
effected through enlarging the mind, which is tantamount to bringing oneself 
into harmony with the universe. The Cheng-meng explains: 
By expanding one's mind one is able to embody the things of the whole world. 
If things are not thus all embodied, there will be something that remains 
external to the mind. The minds of ordinary men are confined within the limits 
of hearing and seeing, whereas the sage, by completely developing his nature, 
prevents his mind from being restricted to hearing and seeing (ch. 7).42 
In other words, if one relates to the universe only with one's physical nature, 
with one's senses, it will reveal itself only partially and only as turbid matter. 
But if one relates to it with one's higher nature, it will reveal itself as a moral 
universe and a harmonious whole. In this ethical perspective, the category 
"natural" must be grasped both in its particularly human sense as well as in its 
reference to nonhuman nature. One can discover human moral nature only 
through an expansion of one's mind which encompasses all of non-human 
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nature. This dual realization of the moral value of the natural as it exists both 
in and outside oneself is referred to by Chang as ch'eng ("sincerity"), the 
concept that was so central in the Chung-yung, his favorite among the early 
Confucian classics. 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this article has been to explicate a Chinese form of naturalistic 
ethics which, due to its underlying view of nature, is not tied to the ideas of 
providence and natural law. Its underlying view of nature, in fact, may be 
quite modern by Western standards. Joseph Needham has argued that it 
borders on being post-Newtonian.43 However, this seems initially to detract 
from rather than add to its moral relevance, for, in the modern view, nature is 
wholly amoral. Contemporary moral philosophy, therefore, would appear to 
have only two alternatives with regard to nature: either to argue for its moral 
relevance by maintaining a premodern view of nature, along with its feature of 
an external lawgiver; or to admit its moral irrelevance on the grounds that it is 
guided by forces indifferent to any divine plan. This is, for example, just the 
kind of choice we are given in the article on "Philosophical Ideas of Nature" 
in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which states: 
If, on the one hand, nature is seen as irreducibly complex, the theater not of a 
simple cosmic process but of countless and diverse processes, and if these 
processes have produced mind but are not themselves guided by intelligence, 
then there will be little plausibility in arguing directly from "natural" to 
"good" or "obligatory." 
On the other hand, where nature is taken as created by a wholly good, wise, 
and omnipotent deity, to be natural is prima facie, to be worthy of being 
created by such a being. But the existence of evil, however accounted for, 
makes the inference (from natural to good or obligatory), even in this context, 
unreliable.44 
The implication here is clearly that both alternatives are dead ends. Moreover, 
while the second of these may still have its supporters,45 it was until recently 
hard to imagine a defense for the first emerging within contemporary Western 
thought. Taking recent theological and ethical discussion informed by process 
philosophy into account, this is easier to imagine. In much of Chinese thought, 
however, it was taken for granted that nature, seen as a complex process in 
which all the parts participate according to their internal dictates rather than 
according to external intelligence, is a moral as well as a physical universe. 
An understanding of the way in which the Chinese were able to find moral 
relevance in nature conceived in nearly post-Newtonian fashion might inspire 
contemporary ethics in a number of "process-oriented" ways. For example, 
this understanding could suggest a "natural" ground for the type of situational 
ethics currently in vogue. For it is quite probable that the most important 
moral values that the Chinese discovered in nature, such as spontaneity, 
harmoniousness, and adaptability to changing influences, provided the basis 
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for their own preference for situational over legalistic ethics. A further 
innovation may come from Chang Tsai's proposal that one's inner moral 
nature is revealed to oneself only concurrently with the act of grasping the 
entire scheme of nature as a moral environment. Ironically, then, with his 
concept of "sincerity," Chang took something akin to that "absence of 
affectation" which J. S. Mill had found to be the only positive value one could 
assign to the term "natural," and he raised it to the level of a necessary and 
sufficient basis for the moral life. 
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